--[ Cyber Domain Dominance: Who Has It, How to Get It and How To Keep It

$ getent passwd glane
├─── name: Gentry Lane
└─ social:
   ├─ linkedin: in/gentrylane/
   └── twitter: @BadassDoGooder

Gentry Lane is the CEO & Founder of ANOVA Intelligence, a venture-backed cyber national security software company that serves American critical infrastructure companies. She holds a DoD-appointed position to the NATO Science & Technology Organization tech panel on the cyber defense of military systems, is a senior fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and a fellow at the National Security Institute at George Mason University.

Ms. Lane is a senior software executive and statistician. She worked with Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s computational security department to develop and commercialize groundbreaking discoveries in the fields of computational anomaly detection and memory forensics. Ms. Lane is a frequent speaker on cyber national security, an internationally recognized subject matter expert on cyberconflict strategy, and she advises members of Congress, NATO and U.S. defense and intelligence leaders. A scholar of military strategy, she believes deterrence in the cyber domain is essential for the preservation of liberal democracies and a free, open, interoperable internet.

A staunch STEMinist, Ms. Lane mentors young women interested in technology with national security applications and is a board advisor to deep tech startups. She is bilingual (English & French).


Contrary to the consensus view, the major threat actors view the optimal use offensive cyber effects not as a digital version of a precision-targeted kinetic effect, but is as a shaping tactic to systematically erode the weight-bearing pillars of critical institutions so that the US is either too weak or too distracted to contest their ascent in the global world order. My theory posits that adversaries leverage cyber power in salami tactics to both avoid the appearance of a trigger event and to effectuate nearly imperceptible, incremental incapacitation of the US's ability to project power and maintain domestic stability.

If this is true, our triage-prioritized counter response is wrong. While the US is preparing for a Cyber Pearl Harbor that will never come, the major threat actors are achieving mission success in a death by a 1000 papercuts strategy.

In this talk, I will show that the current condition is not sustainable, and propose a viable coercion strategy to counter adversary, and talk about the optimal outcome of this new strategy. Drawing from historic precedent from the advent of air power, I will show how to adapt operationalize military strategy from traditional theatres into the cyber domain.